The total costs of corporate borrowing in the loan market : don't ignore the fees by Berg, Tobias et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-017
The Total Costs of Corporate  
Borrowing in the Loan Market:  
Don’t Ignore the Fees
Tobias Berg, Anthony Saunders,  
and Sascha Steffen
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-017
The Total Costs of Corporate  
Borrowing in the Loan Market:  
Don’t Ignore the Fees
Tobias Berg, Anthony Saunders,  
and Sascha Steffen
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16017.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
1 
 
The Total Costs of Corporate Borrowing in the Loan Market: 
Don’t Ignore the Fees 
 
TOBIAS BERG, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, and SASCHA STEFFEN* 
 
February 10, 2015 
Abstract 
More than 80% of US syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically 
specify a menu of spread and different types of fees. We test the predictions of existing theories 
about the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price 
options embedded in loan contracts such as the draw-down option for credit lines and the 
cancellation option in term loans; and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers about the likelihood 
of exercising these options. We also propose a new total-cost-of-borrowing measure that includes 
various fees charged by lenders. 
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Fees are an important part of corporate loan contracting. More than 80% of US syndicated loans 
contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spread and different types 
of fees. Despite this importance, the substantial empirical literature that studies private loan 
contracts largely ignores their complex pricing mechanisms and focuses on a single statistic such 
as an interest rate spread.1 Contracts, however, are not that simple as the following example 
suggests. 
On June 16th, 2010, Meredith Corp., an American media conglomerate, entered into a 
USD 150mn credit line, a commitment by some banks under which Meredith can borrow up to 
the committed amount over a period of 36 months. The contract specifies that Meredith has to 
pay 50bps of the committed amount upfront. Moreover, during the 36 months, Meredith pays 
37.5bps annually for each dollar that is committed but not borrowed. For each dollar borrowed 
under the commitment, it has to pay LIBOR plus 250bps (the interest rate spread). Obviously, it 
is insufficient to describe the contract by simply referring to the interest rate spread.  On the 
contrary, fees are clearly important because of their magnitude and as they are intimately linked 
to states of the world in which Meredith decides to borrow or not to borrow under the 
commitment.2  
In this paper, we take a first step in analyzing the pricing structure and, in particular, the 
role of fees in corporate loan contracts. Why are fees in loan contracts and how are they 
differentially used in the most common loan types, credit lines and term loans? Why do fees 
come in various forms and combinations? And, how are fees set, that is, how do fees vary with 
borrower and other financial market characteristics?  
                                                          
1 A notable exception is the paper by Shockley and Thakor (1997). We extend their paper by empirically 
establishing the option-view of lines of credit and linking fees to the takedown behavior of  borrowers.   
2 The Dealscan FacilityID of this agreement is 256725. The full credit agreement is available via 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65011/000006501110000058/exh.htm.  Information on spreads and fees 
can be found in Section 2.08 (spread) and Section 2.09 (fees).  
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The theoretical literature on loan pricing provides clear predictions regarding the 
existence and magnitude of fees in corporate loan contracts. We start by revisiting these theories 
and identify two main purposes of fees: First, fees are used to price options embedded in 
corporate loan contracts (Thakor et al., 1981). Most credit lines and term loan contracts contain 
option-like features. The empirical loan pricing literature usually lumps credit lines and term 
loans together even though these contracts are inherently different. For example, the most 
widespread option is the option to draw down on a line of credit. Sufi (2009) reports that 82% of 
firm-years in the U.S. have a line of credit and even 32% of otherwise all equity financed firms 
have credit lines. At the time borrowers exercise this option, there is a value transfer from 
lenders to borrowers: borrowers choose to use the credit line if the committed interest rates is 
lower that the current spot market rate. Fees compensate lenders for granting this option. Similar 
arguments apply for the option to cancel a term loan – which is valuable for borrowers and thus 
requires compensation in the form of upfront or cancellation fees. 
The second purpose of fees is to screen borrowers if they have private information about 
exercising any of the options embedded in a loan contract (Thakor and Udell, 1987), and to alter 
ex-post incentives. For example, a borrower can signal a low likelihood of future credit line 
usage by selecting into a contract with a high spread and a low commitment fee.  
 We provide empirical evidence consistent with these theories. First, we empirically 
verify the option-like characteristics of credit lines. In particular, we show that firms are more 
likely to draw on their lines of credit when their economic situation deteriorates. We group 
borrowers into quintiles based on realized equity returns in the first three years after loan 
origination and find significantly higher draw-downs from borrowers with the lowest returns.  
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Second, consistent with this option-view of credit lines, we find that upfront fees and the 
All-in-spread-undrawn (AISU, commitment fee plus facility fee) are larger for high-volatility 
borrowers (measured as either equity volatility or volatility of borrower profitability).  
Furthermore, lines of credit with a spread-increasing performance pricing schedule have lower 
upfront fees and a lower AISU, consistent with the view that the draw-down option contained in 
credit lines is worth less if the loan spread increases as the borrowers' creditworthiness 
deteriorates.  
Third, we provide evidence consistent with borrowers self-selecting into contracts based 
on their private knowledge about the likelihood of exercising the draw-down option. We find 
that borrowers who pay a lower AISU and a higher AISD (All-in-spread-drawn, spread plus 
facility fee) are less likely to draw on their line of credit consistent with Thakor and Udell 
(1987). For example, borrowers in the lowest AISU-to-AISD quintile have an average usage rate 
of 29% in the first three years after loan origination while borrowers in the highest AISU-to-
AISD quintile have average usage rates of 32%. Furthermore, average usage rates are almost 10 
percentage points lower for borrowers whose contracts specify a utilization fee – which apply 
once a borrower's usage exceeds a pre-specified commitment threshold (usually between 30% 
and 50%).  
Our results further suggest that a low AISU-to-AISD ratio and the utilization fee are 
substitutes. In particular, we rarely observe utilization fees in the lowest AISU-to-AISD quintile 
(6% of all contracts) but utilization fees are frequently used in the highest AISU-to-AISD 
quintile (24% of all contracts). We test the screening hypothesis more formally using a positive 
correlation test (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) and the results 
support the univariate evidence.   
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Our analysis of fees is a useful starting point in understanding the contracting 
environment surrounding corporate loan contracts. We document that lenders use a complex 
pricing structure to ensure an appropriate expected return rather than a single price measure, 
thereby accounting for the various options embedded in corporate loan contracts. However, once 
spreads and fees are set, we can use this pricing structure to estimate a cost measure that 
incorporates various fees charged by lenders. In the final part of the paper, we develop a 
comprehensive total-cost-of-borrowing measure (TCB) that accounts for fees, spread and the 
likelihood that they will have to be paid.  We suggest that the TCB measure might be used as an 
alternative to the AISD in future research exploring the cost of debt. 
There are a number of issues that have not been explored in this paper that require 
different types of analyses. We describe some of these issues throughout the paper. Overall, we 
need to better understand (both from a theoretical and empirical perspective) why certain options 
and fees exist and how they determine the timing and state in which value transfers between 
borrowers and lenders occur. Our paper is a first step in this direction. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides basic stylized 
facts on the importance of fees in syndicated loan contracts. Section 2 derives hypotheses on the 
occurrence and magnitude of fees from prior theoretical work and provides empirical evidence 
alongside these hypotheses. Section 3 proposes a new and comprehensive total-cost-of-
borrowing measure that includes the various fees being charged by the lenders. Section 4 
concludes.  
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I.  Data sources, loan types and options, fee types and definitions 
A. Data sources 
We collect all syndicated loans issued by U.S. non-financial firms during the 1986 to 
2011 period from the LPC Dealscan database. We obtain all spreads and fees as well as other 
relevant information including maturity, loan size, facility type, collateral and covenants and 
require that all key loan contract terms are available.3 Using the Dealscan-Compustat Linking 
Database (Chava and Roberts, 2008) we collect financial statement information from the merged 
CRSP/Compustat database for each borrower. We also collect data on credit line usage over the 
three years after origination from CapitalIQ, which has been available since 2000. Our final 
sample spans the 1986 to 2011 period and includes 32,343 loans from Dealscan to 5,481 publicly 
listed borrowers. 21,981 (68%) of these loans are credit lines and 10,362 (32%) are term loans 
(Table I). 
[Table I] 
We construct a second sample, hand-collecting fee information from a random sample of 
1,000 syndicated loan facilities directly from electronic SEC filings and compare the fee 
information from these filings to Dealscan. If fee information is available in the SEC filings, 
Dealscan correctly reports these fees in more than 95% of the cases.  
With respect to upfront fee, however, contracts filed with the SEC frequently refer to a 
non-public fee letter without disclosing the upfront fee directly. Dealscan provides more 
information related to upfront fees than is actually available in the SEC filings. The SEC filings 
specify an upfront fee in 10% of the cases, in a further 77% of the cases the contracts clearly 
indicate that an upfront fee exists but the magnitude is not available via public sources, in 20% of 
                                                          
3 In particular, these contract terms include maturity, loan amount, AISD, and, for lines of credit, AISU.  
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the cases there is no clear trace of an upfront fee in the SEC filings.4 Dealscan provides upfront 
fees in even 25% of the cases. That is, upfront fees are to some extent gathered from non-public 
sources (other than SEC filings) and Dealscan systematically produces more upfront fee 
information than the SEC filings. This suggests that, while borrower and loan characteristics of 
our samples with and without upfront fee information are broadly comparable, the omission of 
upfront fee information in Dealscan might not be idiosnycratic.5 A detailed analysis and 
comparison of the SEC and Dealscan samples are available in our Online Appendix C.   
 
B. Loan types and options embedded in loan contracts  
The most important loan types are credit lines and term loans.6 The empirical loan pricing 
literature usually lumps both loan types together even though these contracts are inherently 
different. While credit lines are commitments of lenders to provide a loan at a contractually 
agreed spread in the future, term loans, in contrast, are fully funded at loan origination. 
Consequently, credit lines and term loans are also different with respect to options embedded in 
these loan contracts and – as will be discussed in the next subsection – in their pricing structure. 
We identify three main options included in loan contracts: 
 
                                                          
4 As an example, the loan contract of Level 3 Communications dated as of Sep, 30th, 1999 specifies: "Level  3  and  
the   Borrowers   agree  to  pay  to  the Administrative  Agent,  for its own account,  fees payable in the amounts and 
at the times separately agreed upon with the Administrative Agent." Indeed, for this specific loan contract, Dealscan 
reports an upfront fee of 87.5 bps, suggesting that Dealscan has obtained private information from the participating 
banks or the borrower.  
5 As an example, while our sample firms are publicly listed, private firms are usually not required to file with the 
SEC and Dealscan collects contract term information from private loan desks. 
6 Dealscan reports a variety of other loan types, such as letters of credit, leases or guarantees. These other loan types 
make up only 4% of the Dealscan observations and we thus exclude them our analysis  
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Option to draw on a line of credit: Each line of credit provides the borrower with an 
option to draw at a pre-specified spread. Borrowers should be more likely to draw down their 
lines of credit when spot market spreads are high, that is, when the option is "in-the-money".    
 
Option to terminate a loan contract: Most corporate loan contracts allow the borrower to 
terminate the loan contract before maturity. The option to terminate is particularly relevant for 
term loans.7 Firms should be more likely to terminate a term loan contract when spot market 
spreads are low. Terminations or renegotiations of loan contracts before the loan matures are 
widespread. For example, Roberts and Sufi (2009) report an unconditional likelihood of 
renegotiation of 9.1% per quarter, of which 4.2% are early terminations.  
 
Option to request a competitive bid ("Competitive bid option (CBO)"): Some corporate 
loan contracts provide the borrower with the option to request a "competitive bid". A CBO 
allows the borrower to solicit the best bid from its syndicated group for a given borrowing 
(Taylor and Sansone (2007)). Therefore, the loan shares by the syndicate participants are backup 
shares in case no sufficient bids are obtained in any of these auctions.8  
 
C. Fee types and definitions  
Fess are an important component of syndicated loan contracts. As noted earlier, about 
80% of the syndicated loans issued over the 1986-2012 period contain at least one fee type in the 
                                                          
7 For credit lines, borrowers do not have to terminate the loan contract to avoid having to pay the full spread. 
Instead, borrowers can simply choose not to draw down the credit line. 
8 If, for example, two lenders each have a USD 50mn share of a USD 100mn revolver, each lender is still allowed to 
bid for a higher amount when the borrower requests liquidity from a credit line. In an extreme case, lender A might 
provide the whole USD 100mn loan if lender A bids for the total amount and lender B bids nothing. 
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Dealscan database.9 We identify 5 different fee types that occur in more than 5% of all loan 
contracts.10 
      [Figure 1] 
In particular, approximately 50% of the loans contain a commitment fee, almost 25% a 
facility fee and some syndicated loans even specify a “collateral monitoring fee”. The average 
fee ranges from 12 bps (utilization fee) to 160 bps (cancellation fee) and is large compared to the 
average interest spread of 190 bps.  
The fee structure of credit lines is more complex compared to term loans. For example, 
four main fee types are present in more than 10% of credit line contracts (upfront fee, facility 
fee, commitment fee, utilization fee) while only two fee types are used in more than 10% of term 
loan contracts (upfront fee, cancellation fee). As term loans are fully funded at origination, only a 
very small number of term loans specify a commitment fee.  
In the following we briefly describe the major fee and spread components. We focus on 
those fees that are present in at least 10% of credit lines or term loans in our sample.11 
(a) Spread over LIBOR: The spread over LIBOR is the interest margin above the interbank 
loan rate charged to borrowers on the drawn portion of the loan.  
(b) Upfront Fee: The one-time fee paid by the borrower to lender(s) at the loan closing 
date.12  
                                                          
9 Online Appendix C contains detailed instructions how to extract the fee information from Dealscan. 
10 Dealscan also reports letter of credit fees. Letter of credits are separate products that are jointly offered with lines 
of credit, with the letter of credit fee being conceptually similar to a loan spread.    
11 The following definitions mainly follow Taylor and Sansone (2007).  
12 For term loans, the upfront fee is conceptually the same as the original-issue-discount (OID), that is, the borrower 
receives the notional reduced by the upfront fee/OID. Credit lines do not have an OID as they are not fully funded at 
origination.   
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(c) Commitment Fee: The fee is paid by borrowers on unused loan commitments. 
Commitment fees are most frequently used in credit lines. For term loans, such fees are 
only used where the exact date of drawing down is not predetermined. 
(d) Facility Fee:13 A facility fee is the annual fee paid on the entire committed amount, 
regardless of usage. Commitment fees and facility fees are usually mutually exclusive. In 
particular, credit lines contain one of these types of fees, but not both.  
(e) Utilization fee: A utilization fee is payable if utilization exceeds a certain percentage, for 
example 30% or 50%, of a credit line. On each day that this percentage is exceeded, the 
fee is payable on all utilizations of the credit line and not merely the portion that exceeds 
the utilization threshold.  
(f) Cancellation fee: A cancellation fee is payable if the borrower cancels the credit 
agreement before maturity. It is usually found in institutional term loan tranches and 
decreases from the origination date to the maturity date (e.g. 3% in the first year, 2% in 
the second year, 1% thereafter).  
 
Table II reports the occurrence of the major fee types segregated by credit ratings for credit lines 
and term loans.  
[Table II] 
Commitment fees and facility fees are generally substitutes and usually mutually 
exclusive of each other. 68.0% of the facilities on average include a facility fee (but not a 
commitment fee) while 28.9% include a commitment fee (but not a facility fee), with 3.0% of the 
facilities containing both fee types. The facility fee is used more frequently by investment grade 
                                                          
13 The facility fee is labeled “annual fee” in Dealscan. We use the wording “facility fee” as this is usually used in the 
credit agreements. 
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borrowers (76.3%) while the commitment fee is used more frequently for non-investment grade 
borrowers (88.7%). Interestingly, the usage of facility fees drops from 54.2% to 28.0% for BB+ 
versus BBB- rated borrowers, that is, at the investment grade / non-investment grade boundary.  
Utilization fees are more likely to be included in loans to borrowers of medium credit 
quality. Credit lines of BBB+ rated borrowers contain a utilization fee in almost one out of two 
contracts. On the other hand, less than 3% of the loans to borrowers rated worse than BB contain 
a utilization fee.  
Cancellation fees are more common in term loans of low quality borrowers. Only 5% of 
loans extended to investment-grade rated borrowers include a cancellation fee. At the same time, 
however, the cancellation fee is included in 10% (23%) of the loans extended to BB (B) rated 
borrowers, mainly in institutional tranches. 
Overall, lenders do not use a single measure such as an interest rate spread to ensure an 
appropriate expected return. On the contrary, lenders use combinations of fees and spread and 
our stylized facts suggest that fees are not just idiosyncratic, but follow clear patterns as to the 
occurrence of certain fee types, for example as a function of borrower risk. Consequently, any 
calculation of an expected return on a loan has to take the fee structure into account, which varies 
with loan type and comprises some fees that are paid upfront and others that are a function of 
borrower behavior (such as drawdowns or cancellations). Importantly, this is very different than 
an expected return calculated based on an interest rate spread.    
The following section discusses theories and provides empirical evidence of why fees are 
in loan contracts, why they come in various forms, and how fees might vary with different 
determinants.  
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II. Economic framework, hypotheses, and empirical evidence 
 In this section, we provide an economic framework for the role of fees in the pricing 
structure of corporate loans, derive hypotheses from the economic framework, and provide 
empirical evidence. We mainly focus on credit lines (i.e., the majority of the sample) but also 
discuss some applications for term loans at the end of the section. Our main claim can be 
summarized as follows: Corporate loans contain various options for borrowers and lenders and 
the pricing (fee) structure reflects the uncertainty associated with these options. Importantly, fees 
are a compensation for options in loan contracts; fees are used to screen borrowers as to their 
likelihood of exercising certain options, and fees are used to alter ex-post incentives to exercise 
these options.  
 We use a common format to investigate the use of fees in loan contracts: First, we 
describe the economic rationale and theory underlying the use of fees in loan contracts. Second, 
we summarize this in a testable hypothesis. Third, we discuss the related empirical evidence.  
Section II.A. examines the role of fees as a compensation for options embedded in credit lines, 
Section II.B. provides evidence that fees are used for ex-ante screening. Section II.C. provides a 
brief discussion of ideas for further research.    
 
A. Fees as compensation for options embedded in corporate loan contracts  
A.1. Option-view of lines of credit – Draw-down behavior 
Description: The theoretical literature views loan commitments as insurance against the 
deterioration of a firm’s creditworthiness as it provides the option for the borrower to draw down 
the credit line (Thakor et al., 1981; Thakor, 1982; Ho and Saunders, 1983; Boot et al., 1987; 
Thakor and Udell, 1987; and Chateau, 1990, Shockley and Thakor, 1997). A borrower will only 
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exercise this option when it is more costly to borrow in the spot market at current market rates.14 
We thus directly get the following hypothesis as to the borrowers' draw-down behavior: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Borrowers are more likely to draw down a line of credit if thei 
creditworthiness has deteriorated since origination than if their creditworthiness has improved.  
 
Empirical evidence: While we cannot directly observe spot market spreads in the loan 
market, we can observe how the borrower's stock price and profitability have evolved after loan 
origination.  Table III provides statistics on the usage of lines of credit based the development of 
the stock return (Panel A) and the change in profitability (EBITDA/sales) over the first three 
years after loan origination (Panel B). We thereby split the sample into sub-samples of 
investment-grade firms (IG), non-investment-grade firms (non-IG) and unrated firms. For each 
of these sub-samples, we sort the observations into quintiles based on stock returns (Panel A) and 
profitability (Panel B). Mean usage rates are lowest for investment grade borrowers, followed by 
non-investment grade and unrated borrowers. Within each sub-sample, we document that credit 
lines are more likely to be used if the borrower's economic performance deteriorates – in 
particular for non-investment grade and non-rated firms.15  
We do not report mean difference tests for brevity, but the average drawdowns between 
the rating categories (IG vs. non-IG, IG vs. unrated and non-IG vs. unrated) are statistically 
                                                          
14 This option-view of lines of credit is, of course, a simplified description of loan contracting. First, borrowers 
might exercise the option for other reasons – for example if they are credit rationed in the spot market (Thakor, 
2005). Second, syndicated loans include provisions that either restrict credit line usage if the credit line is deep-in-
the-money (via covenants or using the MAC clause, see Section II.C for a discussion) or make the draw-down more 
expensive for the borrower (via performance pricing, see Hypothesis 3 for a discussion).   
15 For profitability, we observe a slightly U-shaped pattern, with borrowers with a large decline (5th quintile) and a 
large increase in profitability (1st quintile) having higer usage rates than borrowers with a medium change in 
profitability. However, the difference between mean usage rates of borrowers in the 1st and 3rd quintile is only 
significant at the 10% level, while the difference between the 3rd and the 5th quintile is highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
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significant. This is consistent with what we would expect. Unrated firms are more bank-
dependent and have access to fewer outside funding options. We expect unrated firms to use 
credit lines more extensively, ceteris paribus, compared to rated firms. A similar argument 
applies to the difference in drawdowns of lower versus higher rated firms. Lower (i.e., non-IG) 
rated firms might have more problems raising external capital relative to better rated firms 
suggesting higher usage rates. In multivariate regressions, we also find that investment grade 
borrowers are more likely to use a facility fee while non-investment grade borrowers are more 
likely to use a commitment fee.16 
Appendix Table 1 extends the analysis to a multivariate setting. In particular, we control 
for rating fixed effects on the rating notch level, loan characteristics (logarithm of the facility 
amount, logarithm of the maturity, secured-dummy, sole-lender-dummy, syndicate size, and lead 
size), borrower characteristics (logarithm of total assets, logarithm of coverage ratio, leverage, 
profitability, asset tangibility, current ratio, and the market-to-book ratio), and year, loan 
purpose, loan type and one-digit SIC code fixed effects.. These control variables are described in 
more detail in Appendix A and are used throughout this paper in all multivariate settings. The 
multivariate analysis confirms the univariate results. Thus, consistent with the option-view, lines 
of credit are more likely to be used if a borrower's fundamental credit quality deteriorates.    
[Table III] 
 
 
 
                                                          
16There is also anecdotal evidence that IG rated firms, that is, those firms with access to short-term commercial 
paper markets, usually use credit lines not as alternative funding source but rather as “backup” for commercial paper 
programs. Commercial paper is short-term (1-270 days) and usually uncollateralized, thus short-term investors are 
more willing to provide funding as they can be repaid by firms drawing down their credit lines if necessary. In other 
words, the option to draw facilitates funding in commercial paper markets. 
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A.2. Option-view of lines of credit – Pricing of the draw-down option 
Description: The option-view of lines of credit implies that, when a borrower draws from 
the credit line, there is a wealth transfer from lenders to borrowers. In other words, borrowing 
under loan commitments is a negative NPV loan for banks and they will demand compensation 
ex-ante for the expected loss under the commitment. Upfront fees and unused fees (AISU) are 
part of the pricing structure to compensate banks for writing this option.17 Ceteris paribus, an 
option is more likely to be in the money if the volatility of the underlying (i.e., the volatility of 
the borrower's creditworthiness) is high (Black and Scholes (1973)). Thus, upfront fees and 
unused fees should be an increasing function of the borrower's creditworthiness volatility: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Upfront fees and the All-in-spread-undrawn (commitment and facility fees) are 
increasing functions of the borrowers’ creditworthiness volatility.   
 
Empirical evidence: We use the realized volatility of the borrower’s equity return over 
the year prior to the loan origination date as a proxy for the volatility of the borrower's loan spot 
market spread. For each of the subsamples of investment-grade, non-investment grade and 
unrated borrowers, we group the facilities into quintiles based on the firm's equity volatility and 
report the results in Table IV. We analyze both upfront fees (Panel A) and the AISU (Panel B) 
across these quintiles and split the sample into sub-samples of investment-grade (IG), non-
investment-grade (non-IG) and unrated firms.  
[Table IV] 
                                                          
17 We do not discuss the rationale for paying for the draw-down option via upfront or unused fees here. Please note 
that outside the loan market, option prices are sometimes paid via upfront payments (e.g. call options on stocks) 
while others are paid with a mix of upfront payments and annual payments (e.g. credit default swaps). We discuss 
possible reasons for the choice of upfront versus unused fees in section II.C.    
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For example, upfront fees increase from 25bps (lowest volatility) to 44bps (highest 
volatility) for investment-grade borrowers and the differences across volatility quintiles are large 
and statistically significant. This pattern extends to non-IG and unrated firms. Interestingly, we 
observe the steepest increase in upfront fees for non-IG borrowers. We observe a similar pattern 
for the AISU, that is, firms with higher equity volatility have a significantly larger AISU. 
We perform various robustness tests that we report in Appendix Table 2. First, we report 
multivariate results controlling for loan and borrower characteristics as well as as well as rating 
notch, year, loan purpose, loan type and one-digit SIC code fixed effects. (Panel I). Second, we 
use the volatility of the borrower's profitability (EBITDA/Sales) in the five years prior to 
origination as an alternative proxy for the volatility of the unobservable loan spot market spread 
of the borrower (see Panel II).  Third, we look at pairs of term loans and lines of credit that fulfill 
the following criteria: i) the term loan and the line of credit are originated by the same firm on 
the same day ii) the AISD specified in the line of credit is similar (+/- 15%) to the spread 
specified in the term loan contract (see column (3) and (6) in all Panels of Appendix Table 2). 
Basically, this procedure only looks at at-the-money options and thus ensures that strike prices 
are aligned with the firm's current creditworthiness. In all three robustness tests, the upfront fee 
and AISU are an increasing function of the firm's creditworthiness volatility.18  
Taken together, our results suggest that a higher volatility of stock returns and 
profitability measures are associated with higher upfront fees and a higher AISU, consistent with 
                                                          
18 Our model specifications also control for the syndicate structure such as the number of lenders as well as number 
of lead arrangers, as supply effects could influence the pricing and fee structure. While the number of lenders does 
not enter significantly into the regression, we find that a larger number of lead arrangers increases upfront fees 
significantly. In other tests, we include lender fixed effects to control for the possibility that there are (time-
invariant) differences between lenders in charging fees. Overall, these tests do not change the results presented in 
this paper. Results using lender fixed effects are reported in Online Appendix A. 
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the hypothesis that lenders demand higher compensation if borrowers are more likely to draw 
down their credit lines.  
 
A.3. Option-view of lines of credit – The role of performance pricing 
Description: A large percentage of loans includes performance-pricing provisions 
(Asquith et al. (2005), Manso et al. (2010), Begley (2013), Adam et al. (2014)). These loans 
include performance pricing (PP) grids that are state contingent mappings from a borrower's 
economic condition (measured via ratings or financial ratios) to loan spreads. This feature has 
important implications for the options embedded in credit lines and therefore for fees: The option 
to draw down a credit line becomes less valuable if the spread increases as the borrower’s 
economic condition deteriorates ("spread-increasing performance pricing"). On the contrary, the 
option is more valuable if the spread decreases if the borrower's economic condition improves 
("spread-decreasing performance pricing").19 If the AISD of a credit line fully adjusts to the level 
of the current market interest rate (and thus reflects the riskiness of the borrower), then the 
option value is zero and we would not expect to see any compensation in terms of fees.20 We 
summarize this in the following hypothesis: 
   
Hypothesis 3: Upfront fees and the All-in-spread-undrawn (commitment and facility fees) are 
lower for lines of credit that include a spread-increasing performance pricing provision and 
higher for lines of credit with a spread-decreasing performance pricing schedule. 
                                                          
19 This only holds if the spread can decrease to levels below the spot market spread. If, for example, the credit line 
spread decreases from 100 bps to 50 bps after a downgrade and the spot market spread only decreases from 100 bps 
to 70 bps, then this decreasing performance pricing scheme increases the option value for the borrower.  
20 Consistent with this hypothesis, Ivanov et al. (2014) find that market-based pricing – that is, tying loan interest 
rate spreads to credit default swap spreads  –  significantly reduces fees for lines of credit. While Ivanov et al. (2014) 
attribute the lower fees to a reduction in monitoring costs, their findings can also be explained with a simple option-
view of lines of credit.    
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Empirical evidence: We document that 52% of all credit lines contain a PP schedule. PP 
can adjust the spread in both ways: It can increase the spread if the economic condition 
deteriorates (increasing PP) or increase the spread if the economic condition improves 
(decreasing PP). For each credit line, we determine the current spread at origination 
(Spreadcurrent), as well as the maximum spread (Spreadmax) and the minimum spread (Spreadmin) 
based on the PP grid and group credit lines into three categories: If  Spreadmin = Spreadmax, we 
assign the line of credit to the category "No performance pricing" (10,555 of 21,981 observations 
= 48%). If Spreadmax - Spreadcurrent ≥ Spreadcurrent – Spreadmin, that is, the spread can increase 
more than it can decrease, the credit line is "PP–predominantly increasing" (6,038 of 21,981 
observations = 27%). Finally, if Spreadmax - Spreadcurrent < Spreadcurrent – Spreadmin, that is, the 
spread can decrease more than it can increase, we assign the line of credit to the category "PP–
predominantly decreasing" (5,388 of 21,981 observations = 25%).21   
We analyze upfront fees and AISU across the volatility quintiles for all three cases (no 
performance pricing, PP – predominantly increasing, PP – predominantly decreasing). The 
results are reported in Table V. We find that, on average, mean upfront fees and AISU are 
significantly lower when credit lines contain an increasing PP schedule, consistent with the 
interpretation that PP lowers the option value to draw from the credit line. The differences are 
economically and statistically significant: Increasing PP schemes have 13-19 bps lower upfront 
fees and 4-6 bps lower unused fees (column (5) in Table V). Credit lines with decreasing PP 
schemes have higher unused fees – consistent with an increase in the option value – but upfront 
                                                          
21 For 906 out of 21,981 observations, the performance pricing is "symmetric", that is, spreads can increase exactly 
as much as they can decrease (Spreadmax - Spreadcurrent ≥ Spreadcurrent – Spreadmin). Our results remain very similar if 
we would either drop these observations or assign these lines of credit to the class "PP – predominantly decreasing".  
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fees are not significantly different compared to the "no performance pricing" case (column (4) in 
Table V).      
[Table V] 
 Again, we perform various robustness tests that we report in Appendix Table 3. In 
particular, we report multivariate results controlling for loan and borrower characteristics as well 
as rating notch, year, loan purpose, loan type and one-digit SIC code fixed effects. We also 
develop a continuous performance pricing measure, defined as (Spreadmax – Spreadcurrent) – 
(Spreadcurrent – Spreadmin), where Spreadmax (Spreadmin) is the maximum (minimum) spread under 
the PP schedule and Spreadcurrent is the spread the borrower has to pay for draw-downs based on 
his rating / financial characteristics at origination. This continuous measure is high and positive 
if the spread can increase (but not decrease) significantly under the PP schedule. It is low and 
negative if the PP schedule allows for a significant decrease (but not increase) of loan spreads. 
Thus, the results from the univariate analysis are confirmed in both cases.22      
 
A.4. Option-view of lines of credit – The competitive bid option (CBO) 
Description: As our descriptive evidence in Table II shows, facility fees and commitment 
fees are usually mutually exclusive. Moreover, high quality borrowers (those with an IG rating) 
are more likely to have a facility fee while low quality borrowers are more likely to have a 
commitment fee. There is no theoretical guidance as to why contracts should contain either of 
these two recurring fee types. Note that commitment fees are only paid on the undrawn portion 
of the credit line while facility fees are always paid on the entire committed amount. In principle, 
                                                          
22 Utilization fees – that apply if usage exceeds a certain threshold – are conceptually similar to performance pricing 
schemes. Since utilization is negatively correlated with a borrower's economic performance (see Hypothesis 1), 
utilization fees are more likely to apply when a borrower has been downgraded and/or fundamentals have 
deteriorated. In unreported results, we show that contracts with utilization fees have lower upfront fees and lower 
unused fees (AISU), which is consistent with the results we obtain for performance pricing schemes.  
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however, a contract with a spread and a commitment fee can generate the same state-contingent 
payments as a contract with a spread and a facility fee.23 This sub-section provides a first step in 
explaining this observed empirical regularity. 
An important part of the explanation is the “Competitive Bid Option” (CBO). The CBO 
provides borrowers the option to solicit bids from syndicate lenders that specify the spreads 
based on which they are willing to lend a partial or even the full committed amount under the 
credit line. This can lead to a situation in which a line of credit is fully utilized, but some lenders 
do not provide any funds (because other lenders provide lower bids). Facilities with a CBO thus 
usually contain a facility fee to ensure that the lenders that do not lend under the CBO are still 
paid for their commitment. We thus expect to see a higher percentage of loans with CBO to have 
a facility fee and a higher percentage of loans without CBO to have a commitment fee.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Lines of credit with a competitive bid option (CBO) are more likely to have 
a facility fee and less likely to have a commitment fee. 
 
Empirical evidence: We test this hypothesis and report the results in Table VI. 
[Table VI] 
Panel A (Panel B) of Table VI shows the percentage of loans with a facility fee (commitment 
fee) for loans with and without CBOs and for sub-samples of IG, non-IG and unrated firms. As 
expected, loans with a CBO are significantly more likely to contain a facility fee and less likely 
                                                          
23 A contract with a spread X and a facility fee Y generates the same state-contingent payments as a contract with a 
spread X+Y and a commitment fee of Y, namely X+Y if the loan is drawn and Y if it is not drawn. With a 
competitive bid option, this is no longer true: A lender that does not provide funds for a fully drawn credit line still 
receives a facility fee, but does not receive anything if the contract specifies a commitment fee.      
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to contain a commitment fee. The differences are economically and statistically highly 
significant. Our multivariate regressions tests (Appendix Table 4) confirm these results.  
While the description and analysis of the CBO is a useful start in explaining the choice 
between facility fee and commitment fee, we do have to recognize some caveats: First, the CBO 
does not provide a full explanation of the choice of facility versus commitment fee: There are 
still contracts with CBO that do contain a commitment fee and there are non-CBO contracts that 
contain a facility fee. However, the existence of a CBO is by far the strongest predictor of the 
existence of a facility fee, with t-statistics of around 20 in a multivariate set-up (higher than all 
other explanatory variables). 
Second, we do not try to explain why contracts include a CBO in the first place. The 
existence of a CBO is endogenous and it is beyond the scope of our paper to establish a causal 
link between the existence of a CBO and facility fees. A CBO with a facility fee seems like a 
redundant instrument: Why do borrowers want to include a CBO in a loan contract? It seems to 
us, that borrowers are always free to request additional bids in the spot market, regardless of 
whether they have a CBO or not. We think that the two points raised above might provide an 
interesting avenue for further research, but they are beyond the scope of our paper. 
 
B. Fees as a tool to facilitate ex-ante screening and control ex-post moral hazard  
B.1. AISU versus AISD 
Description: If borrowers have private information about the likelihood of exercising 
options embedded in corporate loan contracts, fees can be used to encourage borrowers to self-
select into different contracts. Ergungor (2001) provides an excellent review of theories that 
rationalize the pricing structure of credit lines via asymmetric information or moral hazard 
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arguments. In particular, Thakor and Udell (1987) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) provide a 
straightforward prediction that borrowers who expect a lower usage rate will self-select into 
contracts paying a low AISU and a high AISD. Thus, we have the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5: Borrowers who pay a lower AISU and a higher AISD are less likely to draw down 
their credit line. 
 
Empirical evidence: Panel A of Table VII provides average usage ratios in the first 3 
years after loan aggregation by AISU-to-AISD-ratio quintiles and rating status (investment 
grade, non-investment grade, not rated).   
[Table VII] 
Consistent with the screening hypothesis, we find that borrowers with low AISU/AISD-
ratios have significantly lower ex-post utilization rates. The difference between the lowest and 
highest quintile by AISU/AISD-ratio ranges from 4.26% (investment grade) to 5.21% (not 
rated). These values are not only statistically significant, but also economically important given 
that the unconditional mean usage rates are approximately 20% (investment grade) and 30-35% 
(non investment grade and not rated).  
A more formal test of this adverse selection story is the positive correlation test 
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006). The basic idea behind this test 
can be illustrated with two simple equations: 
(1)   
𝐴𝐼𝑆𝑈
𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐷 = 𝛽𝑋 + 𝑢 
(2)  𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜀  
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Usage is the average usage of the line of credit, and X is a set of borrower characteristics 
observable to the bank at origination. If borrowers have private information about future credit 
line usage, borrowers with a high likelihood of usage will select into contracts with a lower 
AISU/AISD-ratio. We thus expect the residuals  𝜀 and 𝑢 to be positively correlated (bad types 
have a high 𝜀 and high 𝑢, good types have a low 𝜀 and low 𝑢). The model can also be tested in a 
single-equation reduced form (see Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)): 
(3)  𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜌
𝐴𝐼𝑆𝑈
𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐷 + 𝜀 
Equations (1) and (2) can be jointly estimated using seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) techniques. If control variables X are omitted, SUR reduces to a simple correlation 
between Usage and AISU/AISD. The reduced-form equation (3) can be estimated using standard 
OLS regression. We report multivariate results for equation (3) in Panel A of Appendix Table 5. 
In addition to the standard loan and borrower characteristics and fixed effects (see Appendix 
Table A) we also control for volatility and performance pricing to control for factors we have 
already identified as being relevant for the draw-down option in the hypothesis above. Consistent 
with our prior results, we find a positive and significant effect of the AISU/AISD-ratio on credit 
line usage rates.  
 
B.2. Utilization fee 
Description: Utilization fees are another tool to signal expected usage rates. Utilization 
fees increase the costs of draw-downs once draw-downs exceed a prespecified threshold (usually 
33% or 50%). Thus, borrowers that expect a low probability of large draw-downs can signal this 
by choosing a contract that specifies a utilization fee:  
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Hypothesis 6: Borrowers who pay a utilization fee are less likely to draw on their line of credit.  
 
Empirical evidence:  Panel B of Table VII provides univariate tests for this hypothesis. 
Column (1) provides the fraction of loan contracts that contain a utilization fee. While only 6% 
of all loans in the lowest AISU/AISD-quintile include utilization fees, about 24% of all loans in 
the highest AISU/AISD quintile include utilization fees. These results suggest that the utilization 
fee is a partial substitute for a low AISU/AISD-ratio. Column (2) and (3) provide average usage 
ratios split by contracts that either contain or do not contain a utilization fee. We observe two 
main results: First, we find that average usage ratios are significantly lower for loans with 
utilization fees (see column (4)). In other words, borrowers that anticipate lower usage chose 
contracts that include a utilization fee consistent with Thakor and Udell (1987). Utilization fees 
are most common for medium quality borrowers (see Table II and the related discussion in 
Section I.C.). Given that usage rates increase significantly at the investment-grade/non-
investment-grade boundary, the need to signal future usage might be largest for medium quality 
borrowers.24 Second, the AISU/AISD-ratio is correlated with future usage only for contracts 
without utilization fees. Figure 3 shows this graphically by providing a histogram by 
AISU/AISD-ratio and existence of a utilization fee. We observe that credit lines with a high 
AISU/AISD-ratio are less likely to be left unused, while usage rates of 40% or higher are more 
likely for these credit lines. For contracts with a utilization fee, we observe no difference 
between high versus low AISU/AISD-ratios. Credit lines with a utilization fee are less likely to 
be heavily used.  
[Figure 3] 
                                                          
24 The fact that borrowers in the middle of the credit rating spectrum require more intense screening and monitoring 
is also consistent with Diamond (1991).  
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Again, we test the relationship between future usage and the existence of a utilization fee 
more rigorously using the positive-correlation test. Results are reported in Panel B of Appendix 
Table 5. Consistent with the univariate results, we find that a higher utilization fee reduces usage 
rates and that the AISU/AISD-ratio is positively correlated with future usage only for contracts 
without utilization fee.25   
 
B.3. Screening or altering of ex-post incentives? 
The positive correlation test does not allow to distinguish between the hypotheses of fees 
being used as a screening device versus that of fees being used to alter borrowers' incentives ex-
post (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)). To do so would either 
require either randomly assigning contracts ex-ante (to eliminate the screening explanation) or 
exogenously altering the pricing structure ex-post (to eliminate the ex-post incentives 
explanation). It is not our goal to find the natural experiment or perfect instrument. Rather, we 
seek to demonstrate that loan pricing structures are clearly correlated to ex-post usage of lines of 
credit. Future research might explore a setting as described above to distinguish between these 
explanations. 
 
C. Other options embedded in corporate loan contracts 
Until now, we have focused on the main options found in corporate loans – namely the 
option to draw down a line of credit and the "special cases" of the option to draw in the presence 
of a PP schedule or a competitive bid option. Loan contracts contain a variety of other options. 
                                                          
25 Performance-pricing schemes are conceptually similar to a utilization fee because both vary the payment from the 
borrower to the lender based on some observable outcome that is correlated with the borrower's creditworthiness. 
Consistent with this argumentation, we find in unreported results that borrowers who have contracts with a 
performance pricing scheme are less likely to draw on their lines of credit. 
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Due to lack of space, we cannot provide an exhaustive analysis for all options. However, we will 
briefly discuss other examples of options embedded in loan contracts.  
First, term loans usually include the options to terminate a loan contract for a given 
charge (the cancellation fee). We discuss details about cancellation fees and the option to cancel 
a term loan contract in Online Appendix B. An analogy is the choice between mortgage points 
and interest rates in mortgage pricing that can be used to encourage self-selection based on the 
likelihood of early termination.26 Second, lines for letters of credits include the option to request 
a letter of credit. This option is similar to the option to draw under a line of credit, with the main 
exception that lenders provide a guarantee – but no liquidity – when a letter of credit is drawn. 
Third, some credit lines contain multicurrency options which give the borrower the right to 
choose the borrowing currency. Some features of syndicated loan contracts also provide options 
to lenders: Most contracts include material adverse change clauses (MAC) that give lenders the 
right to terminate a loan contract when a material adverse event is realized.27 Furthermore, 
covenants can be seen as an option for the lender to terminate or renegotiate a loan contract once 
a covenant is breached (Roberts and Sufi, 2009).  
A fully comprehensive list of options embedded in corporate loan contracts is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Furthermore, we do not try to offer a complete explanation of the raison 
d'être or even a full assessment of the value of all these options. Rather, our aim is to point out to 
the types of options in corporate loan contracts and the role that fees play as a compensation and 
screening device for these options. 
        
                                                          
26 Mortgage points are a form of upfront fee or original-issue discount (OID). By paying upfront fees at the 
beginning of a mortgage contract, borrowers can reduce the interest rate on the loan. Brueckner (1994) and LeRoy 
(1996) show that mortgage points can be used to screen borrowers on their likelihood of early termination.   
27 Material adverse events are usually only vaguely defined and thus allows the bank not to keep its illusory promise, 
see Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993) and Thakor (2005) for reputation-based models of MAC clauses.  
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III. Total Cost of Borrowing 
In the previous sections, we have shown that the pricing structure of loan commitments is 
complex and includes a variety of fees. We have tested theories as to why these fees exist and 
found that they are used to (1) price options embedded in loan contracts as well as (2) screen 
borrowers about the likelihood of exercising these option. We now propose a new total-cost-of-
borrowing measure (TCB) that reflects all of these fees. 
Once the menu of spread and fees has been negotiated, we can use this pricing structure 
to estimate the likelihood of exercising the embedded options and thus can calculate the TCB 
measure: 28 
TCB = Upfront Fee / Expected Loan Maturity in Years    (1) 
+ (1-PDD) x (Facility Fee + Commitment Fee)     (2) 
+ PDD x (Facility Fee + Spread)       (3) 
+ PDD x Prob(Utilization>UtilizationThreshhold | Usage > 0) x Utilization Fee (4) 
+ Prob(Cancellation) x Cancellation Fee      (5) 
 
where the expected loan maturity in years is measured as the difference between facility 
start and end date. PDD is the likelihood that the credit line is drawn down; 
Prob(Utilization>UtilizationThreshhold | Usage > 0) is the probability that the utilization of the 
credit line is higher than the thresholds specified in the loan contract conditional on observing 
utilization. Prob(Cancellation) is the probability that the loan is going to be canceled. 
The TCB measure thus reflects the option characteristics of bank loans, differentiates 
between credit lines and term loans (PDD is 1 in case of term loans) and incorporates the various 
                                                          
28 We provide an in-depth discussion as to how to calculate TCB in Online Appendix D using Dealscan data; we 
also provide the TCB measure and the program/code to compute the measure on our website. 
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fees paid to lenders. The AISD, on the other hand, is defined as “Facility Fee + Spread” thereby 
ignoring important loan pricing components that we described above. We thus propose the TCB 
as an alternative to the AISD in future research exploring the cost of loans. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
This study shows that fees are an important part of corporate loan contracts. We test the 
predictions of existing theories about the main purposes of fees and show that fees serve two 
main purposes: First, fees are compensation for options embedded in corporate loan contracts. 
Thus, high-creditworthiness-volatility borrowers need to pay higher upfront and unused fees to 
compensate lenders for providing a draw-down option. However, the draw-down option is worth 
less if the spread (partially) adjusts to the borrower's spot market spread, and thus performance 
sensitive loans have lower fees. Second, fees can be used to screen borrowers as to the likelihood 
of exercising any of these options. For example, we show that borrowers selecting into contracts 
with low unused fees (AISU) and high spreads are less likely to draw down their credit line than 
borrowers selecting into contracts with high unused fees and low spreads. Overall, our results 
suggest that analyzing the fees in the syndicated loan market can provide important insights into 
lender-borrower pricing behavior. 
Looking forward, the results presented in this paper have important implications for the 
literature on loan contracting and loan pricing. First, researchers should be careful in pooling 
credit lines and term loans into a single syndicated loan sample. Option-like features differ 
widely between credit lines and term loans and thus, pricing and fee structures are different as 
well. Second, the analysis of a single measure, such as the AISD, is not sufficient to fully capture 
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the richness of the pricing structure of corporate loans. However, once spreads and fees are set, 
we can use this pricing structure to estimate a total-cost-of-borrowing measure (TCB) that 
incorporates spreads and fees based on the likelihood that each of these components will have to 
be paid by the borrower.  
Our hope is that this study inspires more research exploring the complexity of loan 
contracts. We have provided several suggestions throughout the paper that might be helpful in 
this regard. We also hope that the TCB, as a more comprehensive measure of the debt cost of 
capital (compared with the AISD), is useful to academics in future research. 
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Figure 1 
Spread and fee components of U.S. syndicated loans 
This figure depicts fee types and the proportion of syndicated loans where the respective fee type 
is available in Dealscan. The column Percentage of contracts denotes the percentage of contracts 
where the respective fee is available in Dealscan. The column Mean (in bps) denotes the mean of 
the respective fee type in basis points as reported by Dealscan. Any fee is the percentage of 
syndicated loans where any fee is available on Dealscan. The sample is based on credit lines and 
term loans in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 2011. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
33 
 
Figure 2 
Spread and fee components of U.S. syndicated loans / Credit lines versus Term loans  
T
his figure depicts fee types and the proportion of syndicated loans w
here the respective fee type is available in D
ealscan. Panel A
 provides the 
results for term
 loans, Panel B
 provides the results for credit lines. T
he colum
n Percentage of contracts denotes the percentage of contracts w
here the 
respective fee is available in D
ealscan. T
he colum
n M
ean (in bps) denotes the unconditional m
ean of the respective fee type in basis points as 
reported by D
ealscan. Any fee is the percentage of syndicated loans w
here any fee is available on D
ealscan. T
he sam
ple is based on credit lines and 
term
 loans in the U
.S. syndicated loan m
arket from
 1986 to 2011. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. 
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Figure 3 
 
Utilization of lines of credit  
T
his figure depicts histogram
s of the utilization of lines of credit over the first three years after origination. Panel A
 show
s histogram
s for credit lines 
w
ithout a utilization fee, Panel B
 show
s histogram
s for credit lines w
ith a utilization fee. T
he green bars show
 histogram
s for credit lines in the low
er 
tw
o quintiles of the A
IS
U
/A
ISD
-ratio, the solid bars show
 histogram
s for credit lines in the upper tw
o quintiles of the A
ISU
/A
ISD
-ratio. T
he sam
ple 
is based on credit lines in the U
.S. syndicated loan m
arket from
 1986 to 2011 w
ith available data on credit line usage from
 C
apitalIQ
. V
ariables are 
defined in A
ppendix A
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Table I: Comparing Credit Lines and Term Loans 
T
his table provides sum
m
ary statistics for key price term
s, loan characteristics and borrow
er characteristics. C
olum
n “(I) C
redit lines” reports 
sum
m
ary statistics for the sam
ple of credit lines, colum
n “(II) T
erm
 loans” reports sum
m
ary statistics for term
 loans. Panel A
 reports price term
s, 
Panel B
 reports deal characteristics and Panel C
 reports borrow
er characteristics. T
he sam
ple is based on credit lines and term
 loans in the U
.S. 
syndicated loan m
arket from
 1986 to 2011. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. 
 
 
 
 
(I) Credit Lines 
 
(II) Term Loans 
Variable 
Unit 
 
N 
M
ean 
M
edian 
Std.Dev. 
 
N 
M
ean 
M
edian 
Std.Dev. 
Panel A: Price terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ISD
 
B
asis points 
 
21,981 
156.68 
150.00 
105.98 
 
10,362 
271.16 
250.00 
135.51 
A
ISU
 
B
asis points 
 
21,981 
31.32 
25.00 
18.87 
 
377 
57.75 
50.00 
28.26 
Spread 
B
asis points 
 
21,981 
151.49 
137.50 
107.64 
 
10,362 
270.19 
250.00 
135.62 
C
om
m
itm
ent fee 
B
asis points 
 
15,620 
37.02 
37.50 
17.75 
 
735 
54.34 
50.00 
29.90 
Facility fee 
B
asis points 
 
7,025 
16.16 
12.50 
12.49 
 
313 
27.22 
25.00 
19.70 
U
tilization fee 
B
asis points 
 
2,363 
11.96 
12.50 
7.37 
 
0 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
C
ancellation fee 
B
asis points 
 
971 
153.46 
100.00 
101.27 
 
1,127 
166.51 
100.00 
101.46 
U
pfront fee 
B
asis points 
 
4,758 
49.83 
27.50 
52.92 
 
2,954 
79.88 
50.00 
80.24 
Panel B: Loan characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility am
ount 
U
SD
 m
n 
 
21,981 
350.72 
151.86 
527.80 
 
10,362 
248.05 
108.74 
416.77 
M
aturity 
M
onths 
 
21,981 
44.20 
48.00 
21.99 
 
10,362 
62.42 
60.00 
22.85 
Secured 
0/1 
 
21,981 
0.47 
0.00 
0.50 
 
10,362 
0.69 
1.00 
0.46 
Sole lender (0/1) 
0/1 
 
21,981 
0.18 
0.00 
0.39 
 
10,362 
0.21 
0.00 
0.40 
S
yndicate size 
N
um
ber 
 
21,981 
8.53 
6.00 
8.17 
 
10,362 
7.44 
4.50 
8.35 
L
ead size 
N
um
ber 
 
21,981 
1.37 
1.00 
0.75 
 
10,362 
1.46 
1.00 
0.82 
Panel C: Borrower characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
otal assets 
U
SD
 m
n 
 
20,659 
4304.00 
867.54 
8943.08 
 
8,923 
2672.42 
642.62 
6336.97 
C
overage  
Percent 
 
19,693 
17.70 
5.67 
46.41 
 
8,516 
14.16 
3.80 
44.26 
L
everage 
N
um
ber 
 
20,631 
0.29 
0.26 
0.22 
 
8,918 
0.38 
0.35 
0.28 
Profitability 
N
um
ber 
 
20,474 
0.17 
0.13 
0.13 
 
8,822 
0.16 
0.13 
0.13 
T
angibility 
N
um
ber 
 
20,585 
0.35 
0.30 
0.24 
 
8,887 
0.33 
0.28 
0.23 
C
urrent ratio 
N
um
ber 
 
19,691 
1.86 
1.57 
1.19 
 
8,581 
1.86 
1.55 
1.27 
M
arket-to-book 
N
um
ber 
 
17,913 
1.72 
1.40 
0.96 
 
7,158 
1.64 
1.36 
0.89 
Investm
ent grade 
0/1 
 
8,822 
0.60 
1.00 
0.49 
 
3,511 
0.23 
0.00 
0.42 
N
ot rated 
0/1 
 
21,981 
0.60 
1.00 
0.49 
 
10,362 
0.66 
1.00 
0.47 
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Table II: Existence of fee types in syndicated loan contracts 
T
his table show
s the existence of several fee types by S
&
P rating class. T
he sam
ple is based on credit lines and term
 loans in the U
.S. syndicated loan 
m
arket from
 1986 to 2011. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Credit lines 
 
Credit lines 
 
Term Loans 
 
Facility fee versus Commitment fee 
 
 
 
 
Rating 
Facility Fee 
only 
Commitment  
Fee only 
Both 
Fee Types 
 
Utilization 
Fee 
 
Cancellation 
Fee 
A
A
A
/A
A
 
91.63%
 
8.17%
 
0.20%
 
 
23.71%
 
 
0.00%
 
A
+
 
89.34%
 
10.43%
 
0.23%
 
 
34.69%
 
 
6.90%
 
A
 
87.25%
 
11.74%
 
1.01%
 
 
42.06%
 
 
3.16%
 
A
- 
80.63%
 
17.72%
 
1.65%
 
 
40.99%
 
 
11.11%
 
B
B
B
+
 
72.63%
 
25.85%
 
1.52%
 
 
45.50%
 
 
2.96%
 
B
B
B
 
72.35%
 
26.33%
 
1.33%
 
 
37.46%
 
 
3.02%
 
B
B
B
- 
54.19%
 
44.14%
 
1.67%
 
 
19.74%
 
 
5.86%
 
B
B
+
 
28.00%
 
70.86%
 
1.14%
 
 
9.14%
 
 
7.84%
 
B
B
 
12.23%
 
86.04%
 
1.73%
 
 
3.17%
 
 
10.33%
 
B
B
- 
7.09%
 
91.37%
 
1.54%
 
 
1.06%
 
 
11.22%
 
B
+
 
3.01%
 
95.24%
 
1.75%
 
 
0.52%
 
 
12.79%
 
B
 
4.95%
 
93.49%
 
1.56%
 
 
0.53%
 
 
23.16%
 
B
- and w
orse 
1.21%
 
96.37%
 
2.42%
 
 
0.00%
 
 
20.22%
 
U
nrated 
14.89%
 
80.99%
 
4.13%
 
 
2.87%
 
 
10.54%
 
Total 
28.94%
 
68.04%
 
3.02%
 
 
10.75%
 
 
10.88%
 
T
otal IG
 
76.30%
 
22.49%
 
1.20%
 
 
35.66%
 
 
4.53%
 
T
otal N
on-IG
 
9.67%
 
88.70%
 
1.63%
 
 
2.46%
 
 
13.58%
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Table III: Usage of credit lines and economic performance 
This table presents the usage of credit lines by economic performance. Usage is measured as the average 
percentage usage of the credit line in the first three years after origination. Economic performance is measured 
via the equity return over the first three years after loan origination (Panel A) and the change in profitability 
(EBITDA/sales) over the first three years after loan origination (Panel B). The sample is based on credit lines in 
the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 2011 for which information related to the usage is available in 
CapitalIQ. Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote  significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Measuring economic performance via equity returns 
Quintile IG Non-IG Not rated Total 
1 (Highest equity return) 18.45% 29.89% 28.62% 25.23% 
2 20.18% 28.57% 29.65% 25.98% 
3 22.64% 24.79% 32.60% 27.19% 
4 19.97% 28.35% 34.53% 27.83% 
5 (Lowest equity return) 20.20% 36.04% 43.20% 33.23% 
Q5 – Q1 1.75% 6.15%** 14.58%*** 8.00%*** 
t-stat (1.07) (2.35) (7.71) (6.71) 
 
Panel B: Measuring economic performance via changes in profitability (EBITDA/sales) 
Quintile IG Non-IG Not rated Total 
1 (Increasing profitability) 21.56% 32.46% 33.74% 29.63% 
2 19.88% 33.10% 31.82% 28.35% 
3 18.58% 28.76% 32.87% 27.48% 
4 20.72% 31.75% 31.81% 28.31% 
5 (Decreasing profitability) 24.27% 36.87% 39.93% 34.33% 
Q5 – Q1 2.71% 4.41%* 6.18%*** 4.70%*** 
t-stat (1.58) (1.88) (3.94) (4.39) 
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Table IV: Upfront fees and AISU as a compensation for the option to draw 
This table presents the upfront fee and the All-in-spread-undrawn by quintile of the borrower's equity volatility. 
Panel A provides results for the upfront fee. Panel B provides results for the All-in-spread-undrawn. The sample 
is based on credit lines in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 2011. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. ***, **, * denote  significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Upfront fee  
Quintile IG Non-IG Not 
rated 
Total 
1 (Lowest volatility) 25.01 38.33 30.10 30.64 
2 22.56 37.35 34.18 32.49 
3 27.66 54.09 40.76 40.68 
4 29.61 62.60 43.90 44.62 
5 (Highest volatility) 44.30 79.87 58.31 59.62 
Q5 – Q1 19.29*** 41.54*** 28.21*** 28.98*** 
t-stat (3.80) (5.81) (7.40) (9.91) 
 
Panel B: All-in-spread-undrawn 
Quintile IG Non-IG Not 
rated 
Total 
1 (Lowest volatility) 11.87 32.93 25.22 22.44 
2 12.43 37.06 30.26 25.92 
3 13.40 40.12 33.24 28.28 
4 14.72 43.29 35.60 30.46 
5 (Highest volatility) 20.95 52.18 40.55 36.54 
Q5 – Q1 9.08*** 19.25*** 15.33*** 14.09*** 
t-stat (13.17) (17.47) (24.86) (28.05) 
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Table V: Performance pricing 
This table presents the upfront fee and the All-in-spread-undrawn by quintile of the borrower's equity volatility 
and by existence of a performance pricing scheme. . Panel A provides results for the upfront fee. Panel B 
provides results for the All-in-spread-undrawn. "PP – predominantly increasing (0/1)" is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the credit line contains a performance pricing scheme where the spread can increase more than it 
can decrease, "PP – predominantly decreasing (0/1)" is a dummy variable equal to one if the credit line contains 
a performance pricing scheme where the spread can decrease more than it can increase. The sample is based on 
credit lines in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 2011. Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, 
**, * denote  significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Performance pricing (PP) and the Upfront fee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quintile 
PP – 
predominantly 
decreasing 
No 
performance 
pricing 
PP – 
predominantly 
increasing 
Difference  
(1) versus (2) 
Difference  
(3) versus (2) 
1 (Lowest volatility) 33.72 35.21 21.84 -1.48 (-0.32) -13.37*** (3.42) 
2 37.82 35.27 22.49 2.55 (0.63) -12.78*** (3.50) 
3 41.86 44.91 31.07 -3.05 (-0.63) -13.84**  (2.57) 
4 47.62 48.75 33.51 -1.12 (-0.25) -15.24*** (3.15) 
5 (Highest volatility) 57.43 67.02 47.81 -9.59* (-1.67) -19.20*** (2.86) 
Q5 – Q1 23.71*** 31.81*** 25.97***   
t-stat (4.86) (6.07) (6.42)   
 
Panel B: Performance pricing (PP) and the All-in-spread-undrawn 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quintile 
PP – 
predominantly 
decreasing 
No 
performance 
pricing 
PP – 
predominantly 
increasing 
Difference  
(1) versus (2) 
Difference  
(3) versus (2) 
1 (Lowest volatility) 32.94 21.61 17.63 11.33*** (14.56) -3.98*** (-6.77) 
2 35.88 25.28 19.81 10.60*** (13.44) -5.48*** (-8.13) 
3 38.19 27.15 22.49 11.04*** (13.07) -4.66*** (-6.38) 
4 40.56 28.33 24.36 12.23*** (14.76) -3.97*** (-5.01) 
5 (Highest volatility) 44.07 35.87 29.69 8.20*** (8.36) -6.18*** (-5.96) 
Q5 – Q1 11.13*** 14.26*** 12.06***   
t-stat (12.11) (17.78) (15.88)   
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Table VI: Facility fee versus commitment fee:  
The role of creditworthiness and the competitive bid option 
This table provides statistics on the existence of the facility and commitment fee for credit lines with and 
without competitive bid option. Panel A provides results for the facility fee. Panel B provides results for the 
commitment fee. The sample is based on credit lines in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 2011. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote  significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
Panel A: Facility fee (0/1) 
Competitive Bid 
Option 
IG Non-IG Not rated Total 
CBO in contract 94.00% 54.04% 46.69% 67.24% 
CBO not in contract 71.44% 8.73% 14.80% 25.57% 
Difference 22.56%*** 45.31%*** 31.89%*** 41.67%*** 
t-stat (18.01) (20.72) (32.84) (50.41) 
 
Panel B: Commitment fee (0/1) 
Competitive Bid 
Option 
IG Non-IG Not rated Total 
CBO in contract 8.93% 48.99% 64.63% 40.03% 
CBO not in contract 29.13% 92.81% 88.23% 76.68% 
Difference -20.20%*** -43.82%*** -23.60%*** -36.65%*** 
t-stat (-15.72) (-21.57) (-26.42) (-45.13) 
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Table VII: Usage as a function of the AISU/AISD ratio and the role of the utilization fee 
This table presents the usage by quintile of the credit line's AISU-to-AISD-ratio. The usage of credit lines is 
measured as the average credit line usage of the borrower over the first three years after origination based on 
data from CapitalIQ. Panel A provides results for the usage by quintile of the AISU-to-AISD-ratio and rating 
status (investment grade, non-investment grade, not rated, total). Panel B provides results for the usage  
existence of a utilization fee (column (1)) and the usage of the credit line by existence of utilization fee 
(column (2) and (3)).  The sample is based on credit lines in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1986 to 
2011 with existing credit line usage data from CapitalIQ. Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, * 
denote  significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
Panel A: Usage and AISU/AISD-ratio  
AISU/AISD-
ratio IG Non-IG Not rated Total 
1 (Lowest ratio) 17.95% 30.17% 34.88% 28.74% 
2 23.19% 33.39% 30.90% 29.55% 
3 20.81% 30.77% 33.42% 29.11% 
4 21.51% 32.84% 35.65% 30.90% 
5 (Highest ratio) 22.21% 34.98% 40.08% 32.38% 
Q5 – Q1 4.26%** 4.80%* 5.21%*** 3.64%*** 
t-stat (2.38) (1.93) (2.95) (3.13) 
 
Panel B: The role of the utilization fee  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AISU/AISD-
ratio 
Utilization 
fee (0/1) 
Usage if 
utilization 
fee does 
not exists 
Usage if 
utilization 
fee exists Difference 
1 (Lowest ratio) 5.69% 28.87% 26.66% 2.20% 
2 14.80% 30.35% 24.94% 5.41%*** 
3 19.06% 30.47% 23.35% 7.12%*** 
4 22.91% 33.57% 21.92% 11.64%*** 
5 (Highest ratio) 24.23% 35.65% 22.16% 13.48%*** 
Q5 – Q1 18.54%*** 6.78%*** -4.50%  
t-stat (14.64) (5.28) (-1.36)  
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Appendix A 
Explanation of variables 
 
Variable Source Description 
General 
Credit line Dealscan Loans with type “Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.”, “Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.”, 
“364-Day Facility”, “Limited Line” or “Revolver/Term Loan” as 
indicated in the facility table in Dealscan 
Term Loan Dealscan Loans with type “Term Loan”, “Term Loan A”-“Term Loan H”,or 
“Delay Draw Term Loan” as indicated in the facility table in Dealscan 
Lead arranger Dealscan We follow Bharath et al. (2011) and define a lender as a lead arranger if 
at least one of the following conditions is met: 1) LeadArrangerCredit = 
Yes in the LenderShares table of Dealscan, 2) LenderRole is equal to 
“Agent”, “Admin agent”, “Arranger” or “Lead bank” in the 
LenderShares table of Dealscan, 3) the lender is the sole lender.  
   
Price terms 
AISD Dealscan All-In-Spread-Drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus 
the facility fee 
AISU Dealscan All-In-Spread-Undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the 
commitment fee 
Spread Dealscan Spread over LIBOR (non-LIBOR-based loans are excluded from the 
sample) paid on drawn amounts on credit lines 
Commitment fee Dealscan Fee paid on the unused amount of loan commitments  
Facility fee Dealscan Fee paid on the entire committed amount, regardless of usage 
Utilization fee Dealscan Fee paid on the entire drawn amount once a certain usage threshold has 
been exceeded 
Cancellation fee Dealscan Fee paid if the syndicated loan is cancelled before maturity 
Upfront fee Dealscan Fee paid upon completion of a syndicated loan 
   
Loan characteristics   
Facility amount Dealscan Facility amount in USD mn as indicated in the field FacilityAmt in the 
facility table in Dealscan, adjusted for inflation in year 2005 dollars  
Maturity Dealscan Facility maturity in months as indicated in the field Maturity in the 
facility table in Dealscan 
Secured (0/1) Dealscan Dummy equal to 1 if a facility is secured as indicated by the field 
Secured in the facility table in Dealscan 
Sole Lender (0/1) Dealscan Dummy equal to 1 if a facility is provided solely by a single lender as 
indicated by the LenderShares table in Dealscan  
Syndicate Size Dealscan Number of lenders (lead arranger and participants) of a syndicated loan 
facility as indicated by the LenderShares table in Dealscan 
Lead Size Dealscan Number of lead arrangers of a syndicated loan facility as indicated by the 
LenderShares table in Dealscan 
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Borrower characteristics 
Total assets Compustat Total assets in USD mn, adjusted for inflation in year 2005 dollars 
Coverage Compustat Ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses 
Leverage Compustat Ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of assets 
Profitability Compustat Ratio of EBITDA to sales 
Tangibility Compustat Ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets 
Current ratio Compustat Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
Market-to-book Compustat Ratio of (book value of assets – book value of equity + market value of 
equity) to book value of assets 
Investment grade (0/1) Compustat Dummy equal to 1 if the S&P rating is BBB- or higher. For non-rated 
borrowers this dummy is missing 
Not rated (0/1) Compustat Dummy equal to 1 if no S&P rating for the borrower exists 
   
Other characteristics   
Equity volatility CRSP Equity volatility of the borrower's stock price, measured via daily stock 
returns in the 12 months prior to loan origination 
Profitability volatility Compustat Volatility of EBITDA/sales using annual report data over the three years 
prior to loan origination 
Spreadmin (Spreadmax) Dealscan Minimum (Maximum) spread specified in the performance pricing 
schedule. Equal to the spread if no performance pricing schedule exists 
PP – predominantly 
increasing (0/1) 
Dealscan Dummy equal to one if the credit line contains a performance pricing 
scheme where the spread can increase more than it can decrease 
PP – predominantly 
increasing (0/1) 
Dealscan Dummy equal to one if the credit line contains a performance pricing 
scheme where the spread can decrease more than it can decrease 
PP (continuous 
measure) 
Dealscan (Spreadmax – Spreadcurrent) - (Spreadcurrent - Spreadmin), where Spreadcurrent 
denotes the spread specified in the loan contract as of loan origination 
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Appendix B: Multivariate Results 
 
Appendix Table 1: Usage of credit lines and economic performance  
(Multivariate results for Table III) 
This table provides results of a linear regression of the usage of credit lines on the economic performance 
and control variables. Usage is measured as the average usage of the credit line in the first three years after 
loan origination. Economic performance is measured via the equity return over the first three years after loan 
origination (Columns (1) and (2)) and the change in profitability (EBITDA/sales) over the first three years 
after loan origination (Column (3) and (4)). Column (1) and (3) provide results from a multivariate 
regressions with rating fixed effects (rating notch level). Column (2) and (4) provide results from a 
multivariate regressions controlling for loan and borrower characteristics as well as rating notch, year, loan 
purpose, loan type and one-digit SIC code fixed effects.. Variables are defined in Appendix A. We report t-
values based on standard errors clustered at the borrowing firm in parentheses. ***, **, * denote  
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: 
Measuring 
 economic performance  
via equity returns 
Panel B: 
Measuring  
economic performance  
via changes in 
profitability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Credit 
lines 
Credit lines  Credit lines Credit lines 
 Usage Usage Usage Usage 
Equity Return  -0.062*** -0.066***   
 (-6.78) (-6.67)   
Change in profitability (EBITDA/sales)   -0.205*** -0.168*** 
   (-3.39) (-2.69) 
     
Rating fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Borrower characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Loan purpose fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Loan type fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
One digit SIC code fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
     
Adj. R2 6.95% 19.38% 5.09% 18.34% 
Observations 5,552 4,988 7,573 6,178 
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Appendix Table 2: Upfront fees and AISU as a compensation for the option to draw 
(M
ultivariate results for Table IV) 
T
his table provides results of a linear regression of the upfront fee and the A
ll-in-spread-undraw
n on the m
easures of borrow
er riskiness and 
control variables. Panel I provides results using equity volatility (m
easured in percentage points) as a proxy for borrow
er riskiness and Panel II 
provides results using the standard deviation of profitability (m
easured as E
B
IT
D
A
/sales) over the three years preceding loan origination. Panel 
I.A
/II.A
 provide results for the upfront fee, Panel I.B
/II.B
 provide results for the A
ll-in-spread-undraw
n. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. 
W
e report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrow
ing firm
 in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 %
 
level, respectively.  
Panel I: Using equity volatility as a proxy for risk  
 
Panel I.A: Upfront fee 
 
Panel I.B: AISU
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
A
t-the-m
oney  
credit lines 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
A
t-the-m
oney  
credit lines 
 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
E
quity V
olatility 
0.492*** 
0.359*** 
0.245* 
 
0.226*** 
0.132*** 
0.106*** 
 
(9.07) 
(6.15) 
(1.70) 
 
(23.75) 
(11.92) 
(4.32) 
R
ating fixed effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
B
orrow
er characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
ear fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan purpose fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan type fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ne digit S
IC
 code fixed 
effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
A
dj. R
2 
10.42%
 
35.87%
 
23.36%
 
 
41.26%
 
58.55%
 
32.41%
 
O
bservations 
2,638 
2,274 
503 
 
13,730 
12,063 
1,810 
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  Panel II: Using volatility of profitability (EBITDA/sales) as a proxy for risk  
 
Panel II.A: Upfront fee 
 
Panel II.B: AISU
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
A
t-the-m
oney  
credit lines 
 
C
redit 
lines 
C
redit lines 
A
t-the-m
oney  
credit lines 
 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
Profitability volatility 
58.293*** 
41.509*** 
69.454* 
 
32.473*** 
14.497*** 
27.420*** 
 
(4.51) 
(2.67) 
(1.78) 
 
(10.76) 
(4.84) 
(3.63) 
R
ating fixed effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
B
orrow
er characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
ear fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan purpose fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan type fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ne digit S
IC
 code fixed 
effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
A
dj. R
2 
4.02%
 
34.72%
 
36.49%
 
 
33.26%
 
54.27%
 
28.10%
 
O
bservations 
3,739 
3,141 
734 
 
18,277 
15,659 
2,488 
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Appendix Table 3: Performance pricing 
(M
ultivariate results for Table V) 
T
his table provides results of a linear regression of the upfront fee and the A
ll-in-spread-undraw
n on perform
ance pricing m
easures and control variables. 
Panel A
 provides results for the upfront fee, Panel B
 provides results for the A
ISU
. "PP – predom
inantly increasing (0/1)" is a dum
m
y variable equal to one if 
the credit line contains a perform
ance pricing schem
e w
here the spread can increase m
ore than it can decrease, "PP – predom
inantly decreasing (0/1)" is a 
dum
m
y variable equal to one if the credit line contains a perform
ance pricing schem
e w
here the spread can decrease m
ore than it can increase. "PP 
(continuous m
easure)" is defined as (Spread
m
ax  – S
pread
current ) – (Spread
current  – Spread
m
in ),  w
here Spread
m
ax  is the m
axim
um
 spread from
 the perform
ance 
pricing schem
e, Spread
m
in  is the m
inim
um
 spread from
 the perform
ance pricing schem
e, and Spread
current  is the spread as of loan origination. V
ariables are 
defined in A
ppendix A
. W
e report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrow
ing firm
 in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 %
 level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Upfront fee 
 
Panel B: AISU 
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines  
C
redit lines  
if PP exists 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines  
C
redit lines  
if PP exists 
 
 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
U
pfront fee 
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
A
ISU
 
E
quity V
olatility 
 
0.474*** 
0.352*** 
0.340*** 
 
0.215*** 
0.128*** 
0.096*** 
 
 
(8.77) 
(6.05) 
(4.49) 
 
(23.01) 
(11.72) 
(7.87) 
PP – predom
inantly increasing (0/1) 
 
-13.086*** 
-5.391** 
 
 
-4.216*** 
-3.914*** 
 
 
 
(-6.03) 
(-2.38) 
 
 
(-12.71) 
(-11.62) 
 
PP – predom
inantly decreasing (0/1) 
 
-5.029** 
-2.726 
 
 
5.267*** 
3.984*** 
 
 
 
(-2.15) 
(-1.08) 
 
 
(12.33) 
(8.96) 
 
PP (continuous m
easure) 
 
 
 
-0.064*** 
 
 
 
-0.086*** 
 
 
 
 
(-3.79) 
 
 
 
(-22.70) 
R
ating fixed effects 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan characteristics 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
B
orrow
er characteristics 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
ear fixed effects 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan purpose fixed effects 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan type fixed effects 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ne digit S
IC
 code fixed effects 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
A
dj. R
2 
 
11.56%
 
35.97%
 
42.63%
 
 
44.68%
 
60.80%
 
64.53%
 
O
bservations 
 
2,638 
2,274 
1,319 
 
13,730 
12,063 
6,846 
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Appendix Table 4: Facility fee versus commitment fee: The role of creditworthiness and the competitive bid option 
(M
ultivariate results for Table VI) 
T
his table provides results of a regression of a facility fee dum
m
y (Panel A
) and com
m
itm
ent fee dum
m
y (Panel B
) on a com
petitive bid option 
dum
m
y and control variables. T
he facility fee dum
m
y (Panel A
) is equal to 1 if the credit line contains a facility fee and zero otherw
ise. T
he 
com
m
itm
ent fee dum
m
y (Panel B
) is equal to 1 if the credit line contains a com
m
itm
ent fee and zero otherw
ise. C
olum
n (1) and (4) provides 
results of a linear regression w
ith rating fixed effects (rating notch level), colum
n (2) and (5) add loan characteristics, borrow
er characteristics, 
year, loan purpose, loan type, and one digit S
IC
 code fixed effects, colum
n (3) and (6) report average m
arginal effects from
 a logit regression. 
V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. W
e report t-values based on standard errors clustered at the borrow
ing firm
 in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 %
 level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Facility fee 
 
Panel B: Commitment fee 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
 
Facility fee  
(0/1) 
Facility fee  
(0/1) 
Facility fee  
(0/1) 
 
C
om
m
itm
ent 
fee (0/1) 
C
om
m
itm
ent 
fee (0/1) 
C
om
m
itm
ent 
fee (0/1) 
 
L
inear 
L
inear 
L
ogit 
(m
arg. effects)  
 
L
inear 
L
inear 
L
ogit  
(m
arg. effects) 
C
B
O
 (0/1) 
0.289*** 
0.250*** 
0.225*** 
 
-0.233*** 
-0.212*** 
-0.180*** 
 
(25.80) 
(20.49) 
(16.21) 
 
(-20.99) 
(-17.81) 
(-13.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
ating fixed effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
B
orrow
er characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
ear fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan purpose fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan type fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ne digit S
IC
 code fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
dj. R
2, Pseudo R
2  
37.53%
 
46.35%
 
41.42%
 
 
40.50%
 
50.00%
 
45.91%
 
O
bservations 
21,981 
16,329 
16,329 
 
21,981 
16,329 
16,329 
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Appendix Table 5: Usage as a function of the AISU/AISD-ratio and the role of the utilization fee  
(M
ultivariate results for Table VII) 
T
his table provides results of a regression of the m
ean credit line usage over the first three years after loan origination on the A
ISU
/A
IS
D
-
ratio, the utilization fee, and control variables. Panel A
 provides results for the A
IS
U
/A
IS
D
-ratio. Panel B
 provides results for the 
utilization fee and com
binations of the utilization fee and the A
ISU
/A
ISD
-ratio. C
olum
n (1) and (3) report results for a regression w
ith 
rating fixed effects (rating notch level), colum
n (2), (4) and (5) add loan characteristics, borrow
er characteristics, year, loan purpose, loan 
type, and one digit S
IC
 code fixed effects. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix A
. W
e report t-values based on standard errors clustered at 
the borrow
ing firm
 in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 %
 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Usage and the AISU/AISD-ratio 
 
Panel B: The role of the utilization fee 
 
(1) 
(2) 
 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
C
redit lines 
 
U
sage 
U
sage 
 
U
sage 
U
sage 
U
sage 
A
ISU
/A
IS
D
-ratio 
0.307*** 
0.128* 
 
 
 
 
 
(5.09) 
(1.68) 
 
 
 
 
U
T
F=
=0 x A
ISU
/A
ISD
-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
0.144* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.83) 
U
T
F=
=1 x A
ISU
/A
ISD
-ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.18) 
U
T
F (0/1) 
 
 
 
0.028* 
0.027 
0.050 
 
 
 
 
(1.70) 
(1.45) 
(1.12) 
U
T
F 
 
 
 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
-0.002*** 
 
 
 
 
(-3.15) 
(-2.77) 
(-2.79) 
R
ating fixed effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
B
orrow
er characteristics 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
ear fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan purpose fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
L
oan type fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
ne digit S
IC
 code fixed effects 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
C
ontrols for volatility and perform
ance pricing 
N
o 
Y
es 
 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
A
dj. R
2 
5.34%
 
17.58%
 
 
4.88%
 
17.61%
 
17.67%
 
O
bservations 
7,843 
6,099 
 
7,843 
6,099 
6,099 
 
